Enlightenment is man’s emergence from his self-imposed immaturity. Immaturity is the inability to use one’s understanding without guidance from another. This immaturity is self-imposed when its cause lies not in lack of understanding, but in lack of resolve and courage to use it without guidance from another. Sapere Aude! [dare to know] “Have courage to use your own understanding!”–that is the motto of enlightenment.
啟蒙意即從人類自我施加的不成熟狀態中掙脫出來。這里的不成熟是指不經他人引導便無法運用自己的理智。這種不成熟是自我施加的，其原因不在於缺乏理智，而在於缺乏決心和勇氣去獨立運用它。Sapere Aude!（拉丁語：「敢於求知！」）——這就是啟蒙的格言。
Laziness and cowardice are the reasons why so great a proportion of men, long after nature has released them from alien guidance (natura-liter maiorennes), nonetheless gladly remain in lifelong immaturity, and why it is so easy for others to establish themselves as their guardians. It is so easy to be immature. If I have a book to serve as my understanding, a pastor to serve as my conscience, a physician to determine my diet for me, and so on, I need not exert myself at all. I need not think, if only I can pay: others will readily undertake the irksome work for me. The guardians who have so benevolently taken over the supervision of men have carefully seen to it that the far greatest part of them (including the entire fair sex) regard taking the step to maturity as very dangerous, not to mention difficult. Having first made their domestic livestock dumb, and having carefully made sure that these docile creatures will not take a single step without the go-cart to which they are harnessed, these guardians then show them the danger that threatens them, should they attempt to walk alone. Now this danger is not actually so great, for after falling a few times they would in the end certainly learn to walk; but an example of this kind makes men timid and usually frightens them out of all further attempts.
懶惰與怯懦是為何絕大多數人，在自然早已將他們從外界的引導中解放出來（自然意義上的成年）之後，仍然甘願終身處於不成熟狀態的原因；也是為何他人能如此輕易地以「監護人」自居的原因。保持不成熟是如此輕松！如果我有一本書代我思考，一位牧師充當我自己的良心，一位醫生替我決定飲食，那我根本不需要努力。只要付錢，我便不必思考，他人會替我包辦這些惱人的工作。那些好心接過監護責任的「監護人」們，早已小心翼翼地確保絕大多數人（這其中包括全體女性）把邁向成熟視為危險且艱難之事。他們先讓這些溫順的「家畜」變得愚鈍，並確保這些聽話的生物不敢離開學步車的束縛一步，接著又向他們描繪獨自行走的可怕危險。盡管這種危險其實並不存在——摔過幾次跤後，他們終將學會走路——但這樣的恐嚇讓人膽怯，嚇得他們不敢再作任何嘗試。
Thus, it is difficult for any individual man to work himself out of the immaturity that has all but become his nature. He has even become fond of this state and for the time being is actually incapable of using his own understanding, for no one has ever allowed him to attempt it. Rules and formulas, those mechanical aids to the rational use, or rather misuse, of his natural gifts, are the shackles of a permanent immaturity. Whoever threw them off would still make only an uncertain leap over the smallest ditch, since he is unaccustomed to this kind of free movement. Consequently, only a few have succeeded, by cultivating their own minds, in freeing themselves from immaturity and pursuing a secure course.
因此，對個體而言，掙脫幾乎已成為其天性的不成熟狀態是困難的。他甚至開始偏愛這種狀態，並暫時喪失了獨立運用理智的能力，因為從未有人允許他嘗試。規則與公式——這些理性運用（或誤用）的機械工具——成了永久性不成熟的枷鎖。若有人砸碎這些枷鎖，他也不過是戰戰兢兢地跳過一道小溝，畢竟他還不習慣這種自由的運動。因此，唯有少數人通過培養自己的心智，成功擺脫了不成熟，走上了一條堅定的道路。
But that the public should enlighten itself is more likely; indeed, if it is only allowed freedom, enlightenment is almost inevitable. For even among the entrenched guardians of the great masses a few will always think for themselves, a few who, after having themselves thrown off the yoke of immaturity, will spread the spirit of a rational appreciation for both their own worth and for each person’s calling to think for himself. But it should be particularly noted that if a public that was first placed in this yoke by the guardians is suitably aroused by some of those who are altogether incapable of enlightenment, it may force the guardians themselves to remain under the yoke–so pernicious is it to instill prejudices, for they finally take revenge upon their originators, or on their descendants. Thus a public can only attain enlightenment slowly. Perhaps a revolution can overthrow autocratic despotism and profiteering or power-grabbing oppression, but it can never truly reform a manner of thinking; instead, new prejudices, just like the old ones they replace, will serve as a leash for the great unthinking mass.
然而，公眾的自我啟蒙更有可能實現，甚至可以說，只要給予自由，啟蒙幾乎不可避免。因為即便在那些自封為大眾監護者的人群中，總會有少數獨立思考者。他們在擺脫不成熟的桎梏後，會傳播一種理性精神：既尊重自身價值，也尊重每個人獨立思考的天職。但需特別注意：若一群最初被監護者灌輸偏見的大眾被某些完全無法啟蒙之人煽動，他們可能會反過來迫使監護者自己也戴上枷鎖——灌輸偏見的危害正在於此，因為偏見終將報覆其制造者或其後代。因此，公眾的啟蒙只能緩慢推進。一場革命或許能推翻專制暴政或貪婪的權力壓迫，卻永遠無法真正革新思維方式；新的偏見將如同舊的，繼續束縛那龐大的、未曾獨立思考的大眾。
Nothing is required for this enlightenment, however, except freedom; and the freedom in question is the least harmful of all, namely, the freedom to use reason publicly in all matters. But on all sides I hear: “Do not argue!” The officer says, “Do not argue, drill!” The tax man says, “Do not argue, pay!” The pastor says, “Do not argue, believe!” (Only one ruler in the World says, “Argue as much as you want and about what you want, but obey!”) In this we have examples of pervasive restrictions on freedom. But which restriction hinders enlightenment and which does not, but instead actually advances it? I reply: The public use of one’s reason must always be free, and it alone can bring about enlightenment among mankind; the private use of reason may, however, often be very narrowly restricted, without otherwise hindering the progress of enlightenment. By the public use of one’s own reason I understand the use that anyone as a scholar makes of reason before the entire literate world. I call the private use of reason that which a person may make in a civic post or office that has been entrusted to him. Now in many affairs conducted in the interests of a community, a certain mechanism is required by means of which some of its members must conduct themselves in an entirely passive manner so that through an artificial unanimity the government may guide them toward public ends, or at least prevent them from destroying such ends. Here one certainly must not argue, instead one must obey. However, insofar as this part of the machine also regards himself as a member of the community as a whole, or even of the world community, and as a consequence addresses the public in the role of a scholar, in the proper sense of that term, he can most certainly argue, without thereby harming the affairs for which as a passive member he is partly responsible. Thus it would be disastrous if an officer on duty who was given a command by his superior were to question the appropriateness or utility of the order. He must obey. But as a scholar he cannot be justly constrained from making comments about errors in military service, or from placing them before the public for its judgment. The citizen cannot refuse to pay the taxes imposed on him; indeed, impertinent criticism of such levies, when they should be paid by him, can be punished as a scandal (since it can lead to widespread insubordination). But the same person does not act contrary to civic duty when, as a scholar, he publicly expresses his thoughts regarding the impropriety or even injustice of such taxes. Likewise a pastor is bound to instruct his catecumens and congregation in accordance with the symbol of the church he serves, for he was appointed on that condition. But as a scholar he has complete freedom, indeed even the calling, to impart to the public all of his carefully considered and well-intentioned thoughts concerning mistaken aspects of that symbol, as well as his suggestions for the better arrangement of religious and church matters. Nothing in this can weigh on his conscience. What he teaches in consequence of his office as a servant of the church he sets out as something with regard to which he has no discretion to teach in accord with his own lights; rather, he offers it under the direction and in the name of another. He will say, “Our church teaches this or that and these are the demonstrations it uses.” He thereby extracts for his congregation all practical uses from precepts to which he would not himself subscribe with complete conviction, but whose presentation he can nonetheless undertake, since it is not entirely impossible that truth lies hidden in them, and, in any case, nothing contrary to the very nature of religion is to be found in them. If he believed he could find anything of the latter sort in them, he could not in good conscience serve in his position; he would have to resign. Thus an appointed teacher’s use of his reason for the sake of his congregation is merely private, because, however large the congregation is, this use is always only domestic; in this regard, as a priest, he is not free and cannot be such because he is acting under instructions from someone else. By contrast, the cleric–as a scholar who speaks through his writings to the public as such, i.e., the world–enjoys in this public use of reason an unrestricted freedom to use his own rational capacities and to speak his own mind. For that the (spiritual) guardians of a people should themselves be immature is an absurdity that would insure the perpetuation of absurdities.
啟蒙所需的唯一條件即是自由——且是所有自由中最無害的一種，即在一切事務上公開運用理性的自由。然而，我處處聽到這樣的訓誡：「不許爭辯！」軍官說：「不許爭辯，服從！」稅吏說：「不許爭辯，交錢！」牧師說：「不許爭辯，信仰！」（唯有一位君主說：「盡管爭辯，爭什麽都行，但必須服從！」）在此，我們看到了對自由的普遍限制。但哪些限制阻礙啟蒙？哪些反而促進啟蒙？我的回答是：理性的公開運用必須永遠自由，唯有它能帶來人類啟蒙；而理性的私人運用則可受到嚴格限制，且不妨礙啟蒙的進程。我所謂的「公開運用理性」，是指一個人以「學者」的身份在整個有識公眾面前進行的理性探討；而「私人運用理性」則指一個人在受托的公民職位或職務中的理性使用。在涉及公共利益的許多事務中，需要某種機制使部分成員完全被動地服從，以便政府通過人為的一致實現公共目標，或至少防止目標被破壞。此時，人們必須服從，而非爭辯。然而，作為社會或世界共同體的一員，以學者身份向公眾發言時，他完全可以自由爭辯，而不會損害其作為被動成員所承擔的責任。例如，一名軍官若在執勤時質疑上級命令的合理性，將是災難性的——他必須服從。但作為學者，他有權公開評論軍事服務中的錯誤，並提請公眾評判。公民不能拒絕納稅，對稅法的無禮批評可能因煽動不服從而被懲罰；但同一人以學者身份公開表達對稅制不公的看法，並不違背公民義務。同理，牧師必須按所屬教會的教義教導信徒，但作為學者，他完全有權向公眾提出對教義謬誤的審慎思考及改革建議。這麽做他的良心不會受到指責，因他作為教會仆從的教導並非出自個人意志，而是以他人之名傳遞。他會說：「我們的教會如此教導，並如此論證。」盡管他本人未必完全認同，但仍可為信徒提煉實用訓誡，因其中或許隱藏真理，且至少不違背宗教本質。若他認為教義中存在根本性錯誤，便無法良心無愧地任職，必須辭職。因此，牧師對其信眾的理性使用僅是「私人的」，因其受制於他人指令；但作為學者向公眾（即世界）寫作時，他享有不受限的理性自由。若民眾的「精神監護人」自身不成熟，只會讓荒謬永存。
But would a society of pastors, perhaps a church assembly or venerable presbytery (as those among the Dutch call themselves), not be justified in binding itself by oath to a certain unalterable symbol in order to secure a constant guardianship over each of its members and through them over the people, and this for all time: I say that this is wholly impossible. Such a contract, whose intention is to preclude forever all further enlightenment of the human race, is absolutely null and void, even if it should be ratified by the supreme power, by parliaments, and by the most solemn peace treaties. One age cannot bind itself, and thus conspire, to place a succeeding one in a condition whereby it would be impossible for the later age to expand its knowledge (particularly where it is so very important), to rid itself of errors, and generally to increase its enlightenment. That would be a crime against human nature, whose essential destiny lies precisely in such progress; subsequent generations are thus completely justified in dismissing such agreements as unauthorized and criminal. The criterion of everything that can be agreed upon as a law by a people lies in this question: Can a people impose such a law on itself? Now it might be possible, in anticipation of a better state of affairs, to introduce a provisional order for a specific, short time, all the while giving all citizens, especially clergy, in their role as scholars, the freedom to comment publicly, i.e., in writing, on the present institution’s shortcomings. The provisional order might last until insight into the nature of these matters had become so widespread and obvious that the combined (if not unanimous) voices of the populace could propose to the crown that it take under its protection those congregations that, in accord with their newly gained insight, had organized themselves under altered religious institutions, but without interfering with those wishing to allow matters to remain as before. However, it is absolutely forbidden that they unite into a religious organization that nobody may for the duration of a man’s lifetime publicly question, for so do-ing would deny, render fruitless, and make detrimental to succeeding generations an era in man’s progress toward improvement. A man may put off enlightenment with regard to what he ought to know, though only for a short time and for his own person; but to renounce it for himself, or, even more, for subsequent generations, is to violate and trample man’s divine rights underfoot. And what a people may not decree for itself may still less be imposed on it by a monarch, for his lawgiving authority rests on his unification of the people’s collective will in his own. If he only sees to it that all genuine or purported improvement is consonant with civil order, he can allow his subjects to do what they find necessary to their spiritual well-being, which is not his affair. However, he must prevent anyone from forcibly interfering with another’s working as best he can to determine and promote his well-being. It detracts from his own majesty when he interferes in these matters, since the writings in which his subjects attempt to clarify their insights lend value to his conception of governance. This holds whether he acts from his own highest insight–whereby he calls upon himself the reproach, “Caesar non eat supra grammaticos.”‘–as well as, indeed even more, when he despoils his highest authority by supporting the spiritual despotism of some tyrants in his state over his other subjects.
然而，一個由牧師組成的社群，比如教會大會或者某個「可敬的長老會」（正如荷蘭人所稱呼的），是否有權通過宣誓某種不可更改的教義，以永久監護其成員及民眾？我認為這完全不可行。這種意圖永遠阻止人類進一步啟蒙的契約是絕對無效的，即便它被最高權力機關、議會或最莊嚴的和約批準。一個時代無權捆綁未來，使其無法擴展知識、糾正錯誤、增進啟蒙——這是對人類本質的犯罪，因人類的終極使命正在於進步。後代完全有理由視此類契約為非法。判斷某法律是否可被人民接受的標準在於：人民能否為自己制定此法？ 為迎接更好的狀態，或許可暫時訂立短期過渡性秩序，同時允許所有公民（尤其是作為學者的牧師）自由公開批評現有制度的缺陷。這種過渡秩序可持續至新見解廣泛傳播，民眾能集體（即使未能達成一致地）請求君主保護那些按新見解改革宗教制度卻不妨礙守舊者的群體。但絕對禁止建立一種在世期間不可公開質疑的宗教組織，否則將剝奪後代改進的機會，踐踏人類的神聖權利。一個人可暫緩自身的啟蒙，但放棄自己或後代的啟蒙，即是對人權的侵犯。人民無權為自己制定的法律，君主更無權強加，因他的立法權威源於對人民集體意志的統合。只要確保改良符合公民秩序，君主應允許臣民追求精神福祉——至於這些精神福祉是什麽，並非他的職責範疇。但他必須阻止任何人強迫他人放棄自我完善。若君主幹涉此類追求，反損其威嚴，因臣民闡明見解的著作本可提升他治國理念之價值。這種情形，不論是君主依據自身的高度智慧行事（而被諷刺為「凱撒不能淩駕於語法學家之上」），還是他被某些國家中的「精神暴君」左右，損害了對其他子民的平等對待，其結果都是降低了其至高無上的威望。
If it is now asked, “Do we presently live in an enlightened age?” the answer is, “No, but we do live in an age of enlightenment.” As matters now stand, a great deal is still lacking in order for men as a whole to be, or even to put themselves into a position to be able without external guidance to apply understanding confidently to religious issues. But we do have clear indications that the way is now being opened for men to proceed freely in this direction and that the obstacles to general enlightenment–to their release from their self-imposed immaturity–are gradually diminishing. In this regard, this age is the age of enlightenment, the century of Frederick.
若問「我們是否生活在一個已啟蒙的時代？」答案是「不，但我們生活在一個正在啟蒙的時代。」目前，人類整體尚無法自信地獨立運用理性於宗教事務，仍需外部引導。但顯然，自由啟蒙之路已開啟，阻礙自我施加的不成熟的枷鎖正逐漸瓦解。就此而言，這是啟蒙的時代，是腓特烈的世紀。
A prince who does not find it beneath him to say that he takes it to be his duty to prescribe nothing, but rather to allow men complete freedom in religious matters–who thereby renounces the arrogant title of tolerance–is himself enlightened and deserves to be praised by a grateful present and by posterity as the first, at least where the government is concerned, to release the human race from immaturity and to leave everyone free to use his own reason in all matters of conscience. Under his rule, venerable pastors, in their role as scholars and without prejudice to their official duties, may freely and openly set out for the world’s scrutiny their judgments and views, even where these occasionally differ from the accepted symbol. Still greater freedom is afforded to those who are not restricted by an official post. This spirit of freedom is expanding even where it must struggle against the external obstacles of governments that misunderstand their own function. Such governments are illuminated by the example that the existence of freedom need not give cause for the least concern regarding public order and harmony in the commonwealth. If only they refrain from inventing artifices to keep themselves in it, men will gradually raise themselves from barbarism.
一位不以「寬容」自居、宣稱有責任不在宗教事務中強加己見、賦予人類完全自由的君主，本身即是啟蒙者，值得現世與後世的讚譽——至少就國家治理而言，他是首位使人類擺脫不成熟、允許所有人憑良心自由運用理性之人。在他的統治下，德高望重的牧師能以學者身份（不違背職務）自由公開地向世界闡述異於正統教義的判斷；無公職者則享有更大自由。這種自由的精神正在日益擴展，哪怕它不得不與誤解自己職責的政府勢力抗爭。但正是由於有了榜樣的存在，那些政府也漸漸被啟發：給予人民自由，並不會對公共秩序與社會和諧構成威脅。只要政府不設人為障礙，人類將逐漸擺脫野蠻。
I have focused on religious matters in setting out my main point concerning enlightenment, i.e., man’s emergence from self-imposed immaturity, first because our rulers have no interest in assuming the role of their subjects’ guardians with respect to the arts and sciences, and secondly because that form of immaturity is both the most pernicious and disgraceful of all. But the manner of thinking of a head of state who favors religious enlightenment goes even further, for he realizes that there is no danger to his legislation in allowing his subjects to use reason publicly and to set before the world their thoughts concerning better formulations of his laws, even if this involves frank criticism of legislation currently in effect. We have before us a shining example, with respect to which no monarch surpasses the one whom we honor.
我以宗教問題闡述啟蒙（即人類脫離自我不成熟）的主因有二：其一，統治者無意在藝術科學領域充當臣民的監護人；其二，宗教不成熟最有害且可恥。但凡有一位國家元首，願意在宗教啟蒙方面帶頭推行改革，他的思維方式就必然走得更遠。他明白，允許臣民公開運用理性、提出對現行法律的批評（即便直言不諱）不會威脅立法。我們眼前有一位無與倫比的榜樣。
But only a ruler who is himself enlightened and has no dread of shadows, yet who likewise has a well-disciplined, numerous army to guarantee public peace, can say what no republic may dare, namely: “Argue as much as you want and about what you want, but obey!” Here as elsewhere, when things are considered in broad perspective, a strange, unexpected pattern in human affairs reveals itself, one in which almost everything is paradoxical. A greater degree of civil freedom seems advantageous to a people’s spiritual freedom; yet the former established impassable boundaries for the latter; conversely, a lesser degree of civil freedom provides enough room for all fully to expand their abilities. Thus, once nature has removed the hard shell from this kernel for which she has most fondly cared, namely, the inclination to and vocation for free thinking, the kernel gradually reacts on a people’s mentality (whereby they become increasingly able to act freely), and it finally even influences the principles of government, which finds that it can profit by treating men, who are now more than machines, in accord with their dignity.
唯有自身啟蒙、不懼陰影，且擁有紀律嚴明的龐大軍隊保障公共安全的君主，才能說出共和國不敢之言：「盡管爭辯，爭什麽都行，但必須服從！」在此（亦如其他廣泛視角下的事物），人類事務顯露出一種奇異矛盾的規律：更高程度的公民自由，看似有利於精神自由，卻往往對後者設限；而較低程度的公民自由，反倒為人類能力的全面展開提供了空間。因此，當自然剝去她最珍視的硬殼而露出其內核——自由思考的天性與使命——便將逐漸滲透進人們的思維方式，使他們愈加能夠自如地行動，最終影響治理原則：政府會發現，以符合人類尊嚴（而非視其為機器）的方式對待臣民，將使自己受益。
